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INTRODUCTION 
The Dissonance Theory was first put forth by Leon Festinger 
(1957). In his original work, Festinger theorized that "if two 
cognitive elements are relevant, the relation between them is either 
dissonant or consonant. The magnitude of the dissonance increases as 
the importance or value of the elements increases." According to 
Festinger's supposition, a person will experience dissonance if he 
perceives a contradiction or incongruity to exist between relevant, 
cognitive elements. Festinger explains further that this resulting 
dissonance "acts in the same way as a state of drive or need or ten-
sion" (Festinger, 1957, pp. 16, 18). 
Using Festinger's description of dissonance as a state of drive or 
tension, Cronkhite (1966) posed two hypotheses relating to dissonance: 
1) When an individual perceives two or more cognitions to be 
"dissonant," he experiences a state of drive or arousal; 
and 
2) The individual experiencing the state of drive or arousal 
will behave in such a way designed to reduce the drive. 
In his studies, Cronkhite defined the degree of dissonance as the 
magnitude of the difference between a subject's attitude toward the 
concept and his attitude toward the source. Therefore, the greater 
the difference between attitude toward source and attitude toward the 
concept, the greater the intensity of dissonance. Cronkhite believed 
the state of arousal relating to dissonance was a physical phenomena. 
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Arousal, as defined by Berlyne (1960), is "a unitary emotional response 
dimension ranging from sleep to frantic excitement." 
Using both Festinger and Cronkhite's definitions, it would appear 
that dissonance is an emotional state involving cognitive elements . 
Chapanis and Chapanis (1964) furthered the idea that dissonance is an 
emotion with their definition: 
The basic premise is that discrepant cognitions create 
tension which the individual strives to reduce by making 
his cognitions more consistent. This tension is called 
cognitive dissonance ••• 
Tension is also defined as an emotional state by Mehrabian and Russell 
( 1977). 
Two years after Cronkhite presented his operational definition of 
dissonance, Aronson (1968) hypothesized that dissonance is a "signifi-
cant motivational force only when the self-concept or some other firmly 
held expectancy was involved." In his definition, Aronson uses two 
terms, which lead the reader to believe dissonance is an emotion: 
"motivational force" and "expectancy." 
Malkis (1982) defined dissonance as a state of tension or 
disequilibrium caused by a logical or connotative inconsistency among 
cognitions. Because tension is considered an emotional response 
(Mehrabian and Russell, 1977), Malkis' further portrays dissonance as 
an emotion. 
Despite these and numerous other attempts to explain dissonance, 
few authors have provided operational definitions allowing for the 
actual measurement of dissonance. Biggers and Christ (1983) recognized 
this problem and formulated an operational definition using three 
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dimensions of emotional response: pleasure-displeasure, arousal-sleep, 
and dominance-submissiveness. Conceiving of dissonance as an emotional 
state resulting from inconsistent psychological elements, they define 
dissonance as "an emotional state composed of low pleasure, high 
arousal, and at least moderately high dominance ... 
~his concept opens new avenues by which proven tools for gauging 
emotions can be applied to the neglected problem of measuring dis-
sonance. The purpose of this paper is to examine the emotional 
component of dissonance and to present a viable instrument for its 
measurement. 
Background Research 
From the first dissonance research to the present investigators 
have failed to measure dissonance itself. Festinger and Carlsmith 
(1959) conducted an experiment in which subjects completed a boring 
task and then were asked to tell other subjects (actually confederates6 
that the task had been interesting. Some subjects were paid $1.00 
to participate in counter-attitudinal advocacy (CAA) while others 
received $20. Festinger and Carlsmith found subjects who were paid $1 
believed the task was significantly more enjoyable than those in both 
the control group and the $20 condition. 
The authors explained that subjects receiving only $1 for their 
CAA did not feel the payment was enough justification for the action; 
so in order to regain consonance, they changed attitudes to fit the 
role play of praise for the task. Thus, Festinger's theory becomes a 
theory of "insufficient justification." 
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Dissonance studies have varied justification in many ways. Miller 
(1973) found that most studies manipulated material reward. At the 
writing of his article, at least 24 studies had used cash or something 
with cash value; 10 studies utilized audience approval or disapproval; 
justification was linked to the attractiveness of the sponsor in six 
studies; and four or more studies varied the numbers of reasons for 
participating in CAA. 
Justification is difficult to manipulate. Berger (1969) paid sub-
jects $2.50 or $.50, and asked them to rate the adequacy of this reward 
on a four-point scale. The high justification subjects ranked $2.50 
as maximally adequate with a 4.0 on a four-point scale, and yet those 
who received $.50 did not rate their reward below a 3.0. These find-
ings illustrate the difficulty faced when attempting to achieve a 
perception of low justification. Bachman, Bukowski, Forkner and Peretz 
(1969) believed subjects who received $.50, yet knew others were 
receiving $2.50, would be disgruntled. Results did not support this 
assumption. In fact, they found $.50 was conceived to be adequate. 
Some studies have not manipulated the reward form of justification 
in order to produce dissonance (Goethals, Cooper & Naficy, 1979; Hig-
gins, Rhodewalt & Zanna, 1979); though, these studies did try to ensure 
that subjects were aware of the freedom to choose participation. 
Cooper and Worchel (1970) manipulated justification and consequence, 
concluding that both are necessary elements of dissonance. Goethals, 
Cooper and Naficy (1979) manipulated three levels of consequence 
while Higgins et al. (1979) varied arousal and pleasure as types of 
consequences. Both studies achieved results attributed to dissonance 
without manipulating reward. Other authors have not given a reward 
for participation in CAA (i.e., money or extra credit), and yet 
achieved dissonance effects (Bazerman, Guiliano & Appelman, 1984; 
Beauvais & Joule, 1982; Goethals et al., 1979; Higgins et al., 1979; 
Rholes, Baily & McMillan, 1982; Steele & Liu, 1981). These studies 
lead the reader to believe consequence as well as reward and freedom 
to choose can be considered a form of justification since it produces 
dissonance effects singly. 
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Public commitment enhances the perception of negative consequences 
resulting in dissonance. Carlsmith, Collins and Helmreich (1966) 
demonstrated that subjects who role played to a confederate had greater 
attitude change with less justification than students who wrote CAA 
essays receiving the greater reward. They concluded that for disso-
nance results, CAA must be public. 
However, studies have effectively used essays instead of public 
commitment to achieve dissonance. The key is that a person must fore-
see negative consequences resulting from their behavior whether public 
or by essay. Linder, Cooper and Jones (1967) found dissonance effects 
by manipulating incentive and choice after asking subjects to write 
an essay advocating a ban on Communist speakers at state-supported 
institutions. Other researchers have used CAA essays as a means of 
producing dissonance when the subject perceives possible negative 
consequences from their actions. (Higgins, Rhodewalt & Zanna, 1979; 
Zanna, Higgins & Taves, 1976). 
As mentioned briefly before, a form of justification required 
for dissonance is perception of choice. In Festinger and Carlsmith 
(1959), subjects were given the option of refusing to role play. 
Linder et al. (1967) manipulated choice as a variable affecting disso-
nance. They discovered an inverse relationship between magnitude of 
incentive and attitude change for subjects who were given the choice 
of participating in role play and a positive relationship for those 
who were not given any alternatives. This result was credited to 
dissonance. Most subsequent studies have assumed that choice is an 
inherent part of dissonance production. 
As discussed earlier, despite advances made in the study of 
conditions necessary to produce dissonance, few authors have defined 
dissonance operationally. This lack of definition has made it diffi-
cult for dissonance advocates to support its existence. Festinger 
(1957, p. 15) recognized this problem when he formulated the theory 
originally: 
The conceptual definitions of dissonance and consonance 
present some serious difficulties. If the theory of dis-
sonance is to have relevance for empirical data, one must be 
able to identify dissonances and consonances unequivocally. 
But it is clearly hopeless to attempt to obtain a complete 
listing of cognitive elements, and even were such a listing 
available, in some cases it would be difficult or impossible 
to say, a priori, which of the three relationships holds. 
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Several researchers have sought to dispel this problem. Cronkhite 
(1966) perceived dissonance as a state of drive or arousal, a physio-
logical state. He measured the physiological state of his subjects 
(i.e., heartbeat) before, during, and after they listened to a speech 
contrary to their beliefs. He did not find support for dissonance 
using physical measurement of arousal. Subjects in the high dissonance 
condition demonstrated less physical arousal than those in the low 
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dissonance cell. (The arousal of dissonance should be questioned in 
this study since there were no apparent negative consequences perceived 
by the subjects.) Surprisingly, participants who did experience a 
high degree of arousal did not seek available means of dissonance 
reduction. 
Linder et al. (1967) used response latency to measure disson nee . 
These authors offered subjects $.50 and $2.50 to participate in essay 
writing. After a few trial runs, the experimenter began to notice 
subjects in the high-choice/low-incentive condition took longer 
to decide whether to participate than those in the high-choice/high-
incentive category. He began to time the decision process with a 
hidden stop watch and, interestingly enough, discovered that subjects 
in the high-choice/low-incentive group used considerably more time 
in the decision-making process than those in the high-choice/high-
incenti ve condition. The authors concluded that pre-decisional 
conflict leads to post-decisional dissonance. They also examined the 
essays of the four groups for differences in length, persuasiveness, 
argument, and organization of essays. No significance resulted from 
this effort to measure dissonance. 
Carlsmith et al. (1966) did include a measurement of dissonance in 
their study. Confederates were asked to rate apparent conflict and 
signs of discomfort in subjects. Subjects in the low-incentive condi-
tion demonstrated the greatest conflict. 
Although the aforementioned studies did provide a measure of 
dissonance, they demonstrate little progress toward a standardized 
measure of dissonance. Without such a measure, the hypothesized 
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relationships between dissonance and attitude change cannot be vali-
dated. Miller (1973) claimed this oversight is one of the significant 
problems prohibiting progress of dissonance research. Despite Miller' 
analysis, experimenters continue to conduct research explaining results 
with dissonance theory. Their persistence is difficult to understand 
since the mechanism through which dissonance is created and reduced 
has not been specified (Biggers & Christ, 1983). 
Few researchers in recent years have sought to measure the state 
of dissonance or even investigate elements of the state (i.e., pleasure 
and dominance). Higgins, Rhodewalt and Zanna (1979) noted three ways 
of reducing dissonance: attitude change, addition of a cognition, and 
misattribution. Therefore, a possible conclusion is that dissonance 
may be present even though no attitude change results from CAA. Storms 
and Nisbett (1970) found that when subjects were given a pill (actually 
a placebo) and told that it would cause side affects of arousal, they 
had less attitude change; instead reducing dissonance with misattribu-
tion. The authors concluded that arousal is part of dissonance and, 
if subjects can blame arousal experienced on the drug, they will not 
report as great a change in attitude. 
Zanna and Cooper (1974) carried this research further by demon-
strating that subjects who were given a relaxing pill experienced 
more attitude change. This was attributed to the possibility that 
subjects could not blame their unpleasant state on the pill. Other 
researchers have emphasized that arousal is a necessary component of 
dissonance (Kiesler & Pallack, 1976; Pittman, 1975). 
Zanna and Cooper (1976) discovered that subjects who ingested a 
pill but were provided no information on side effects had no signifi-
cant attitude change. It must be noted that attitude change is not 
the only indication of dissonance. Zanna et al. (1976), by giving 
their subjects a pill, may have also given them something to blame 
their discomfort on (misattribution), even though the individuals were 
not told what side effects to expect. 
Higgins et al. (1979) decided to examine pleasure as a component 
of dissonance rather than arousal. They hypothesized that unpleas-
antness, and not arousal, is the motivating factor for dissonance 
reduction (assuming dissonance exists). 
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They believed that inconsistencies produce an unpleasant arousal, 
and purposed to study whether arousal is part of dissonance or a conse-
quence of unpleasantness. By manipulating choice and information about 
the pills given (pleasant and unpleasant, arousing and non-arousing 
side effects), Higgins et al. (1979) concluded that future research 
should consider unpleasantness a component of dissonance; and, though 
high arousal may be present in the beginning stages, it is not a factor 
in reducing dissonance. 
Though these people (Storm & Nisbett, 1970; Zanna & Cooper, 1974; 
Pittman, 1975; Kiesler & Pallak, 1976; Zanna et al., 1976; Higgins et 
al., 1979) are responsible for advances made in the study of dissonance 
components, they failed to measure dissonance itself. The results of 
this research, however, are important cornerstones for the operational 
definition of dissonance and subsequent tool for measurement discussed 
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later. If dissonance can be shown to exist, the many otherwise excel-
lent studies on the subject will gain credibility in the scientific 
community. 
Cognitive dissonance has practically become a household word. The 
dissonant state and its value as a persuasive property, continue to 
fascinate researchers up to the present. In recent years, disson nc 
studies have examined management behavior relating to justification 
of commitment to a course of action. In one study of individual 
responsibility Bazerman (1984) found in a simulated situation subjects 
would escalate financial support of a failing business venture if told 
they had been responsible for the initial investment decision and 
subsequent support given to that business. Groups and individuals not 
responsible for the initial investment in the now failing business did 
not increase financial backing. These results were attributed to 
dissonance. However, dissonance was neither defined or measured. 
Frey from Germany and Beauvois and Joule from France have also 
conducted dissonance studies (Frey, 1982; Beauvois & Joule, 1982). 
Their research demonstrates the far-reaching effects of dissonance 
theory and the international interest it has received. These research-
ers provided information about the avoidance of dissonant information, 
and the effect of performance evaluation on subsequent attitudes toward 
a boring task. Both studies explained findings with the dissonance 
theory, yet did not operationally define this emotional state. 
These examples are given to illustrate the tautology present in 
the over 900 articles and studies relating to dissonance. A noticeable 
void exists where there should be operational definition and a means 
for measuring this thought-provoking physiological and psychological 
state. 
Dissonance and Emotion 
The many definitions discussed at the beginning of this paper 
describe dissonance as an emotional state. Dissonance researchers 
have also investigated components of dissonance, such as arousal and 
pleasure, indicating again that dissonance is an emotion (Cronkhite, 
1966; Higgins et al., 1979; Zanna & Cooper, 1976). 
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Biggers and Christ (1983) have suggested that since dissonance is 
an emotion, it can be measured with an emotion scale. They noted 
that a growing body of literature exists suggesting emotional states 
are interrelated and can be measured with a three-factor system: 
pleasure-displeasure, degree of arousal, and dominance-submissiveness 
(Mehrabian & Russell, 1974; Mehrabian, 1980). There is indication 
that a common core of emotional responses exists and stimulation of 
one emotion influences perception in another mode (Mehrabian & 
Russell, 1974). Biggers and Christ cite many studies which demonstrat 
the interrelationship between pleasure and arousal; and, some disso-
nance researchers have examined the relationship in detail (Zanna & 
Cooper, 1976; Zanna et al., 1976; Higgins et al., 1979). Higgins et 
al. (1979) summarized that unpleasantness is a component of dissonance 
with arousal being present in the beginning stages of the emotion. 
Russell (1980) asked subjects to group emotional terms such a s 
frustrated, sleepy, and glad into related categories. He found that 
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these categories fit the three dimensions of pleasure, arousal, and 
dominance with little overlap. Russell and Mehrabian (1977) and 
Russell (1979) demonstrated that subjects can accurately report their 
own emotional state using the three factor solution. These authors 
claim the dimension of pleasure-displeasure is a feeling "that can be 
assessed readily with semantic differential measures or with behavior 1 
indicators such as smiles, laughter, and, iu general, positive versus 
negative facial expressions. Arousal can also be measured with the 
semantic differential scale as "a unitary emotional response dimension 
ranging from sleep to frantic excitement" (Berlyne, 1960). Some non-
verbal measures of arousal are vocal activity, facial activity, speech 
rate and speech volume. Lastly, "dominance-submissiveness is a feeling 
state that can be assessed from verbal reports using the semantic 
differential method" and behavior such as relaxation (Mehrabian, 1970, 
1972). Dominance-submissiveness operates as permission to behave. 
Biggers and Christ (1983) describe this emotional component as a range 
"from extreme feelings of being influenced and controlled to feelings 
of mastery and control." A more detailed explanation of dominance 
follows: 
When a person feels dominant (s)he feels as if (s)he has 
freedom to enact a full range of behavior. When pleasure 
and arousal are high we expect strong approach behavior, 
if one also feels dominant (s)he would approach more 
than (s)he felt submissive. (Biggers and Christ, 1983) 
A list of bipolar adjectives was developed by Mehrabian and 
Russell (1974) with which subjects can record their emotional responses 
along the three dimensions of pleasure, arousal and dominance. This 
instrument produced a reliability score above alpha .80 (Mehrabian & 
Russell, 197 4). 
Taking their research further, Russell and Mehrabian (1977) 
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listed 151 emotional states and defined them in reference to the three 
emotional dimensions. For example, enjoyment is comprised of pleasure, 
arousal and dominance. On this 18-bipolar adjective scale, guilt and 
tension rate low in pleasure and dominance and high in arousal. They 
concluded that these dimensions are necessary for the defining of 
emotional states, but they questioned if these factors are adequate 
for all emotional states. 
There are over 2,000 terms in English denoting various emotional 
states (Wallace & Carson, 1973). Some researchers place these in 
independent categories claiming that all emotions are mutually ex-
clusive, while others focus on the interrelationships of emotional 
clusters. McNair, Lou and Droppleman (1971) presented a list of six 
uni-po~ar emotional states: tension-anxiety, depression-dejection, 
anger-hostility, vigor-activity, fatigue-inertia, and friendliness. 
Russell and Steiger (1982) found that the three dimensions given 
earlier (pleasure-displeasure, arousal-sleepiness, and dominance-
submissiveness) actually encompass the various emotional states more 
comprehensively. 
Russell and Steiger utilized the three dimensions in two ways: 
measuring the emotional state of others and measuring one's own emo-
tional state (Russell & Steiger, 1982). They found the emotional 
scale developed by Russell and Mehrabian (1974) satisfactory as a 
reliable instrument useful for reporting on the emotional state of 
others as well describing the emotional state of self. 
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Russell and Mehrabian's (1978) results indicate that emot ons 
influence the behavioral responses of individuals. According to this 
research, pleasure and arousal determine approach avoidance. Disso-
nance has also been studied in relation to approach avoidance (Steele & 
Liu, 19 81 ; Frey , 19 8 2 ) • 
Biggers and Pryor (1982) examined these two dimensions with 
respect to attitude change. When the environment elicited pleasurable 
responses, the speech was more effective in producing a change in 
attitude toward agreement with the speech. However, an environment 
which promoted low pleasure actually produced an opinion change in 
the opposite direction of that advocated by the speaker. 
Biggers and Christ (1983) argued that a person's emotional re-
sponse is comprised of a common core of emotion or the three affect 
dimensions: pleasure, arousal and dominance (Mehrabian & Russell, 
1974; Russell & Mehrabian, 1977; Russell, 1980). If this is the case, 
changes in emotion should be measurable along the three dimensions. 
This paper seeks to apply the three affect dimensions to the measure-
ment of dissonance. 
Various researchers interpret these three factors as being 
affective rather than cognitive. Biggers and Christ (1983) claim that 
"the emotions elicited by a group of stimuli can be described as an 
affective or feeling state that is the primary response of the organism 
to the situation." However, Lazarus (1982) writes that the emot'on 
experience includes three components: thoughts, action impulses and 
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semantic disturbances. He believed that the cognitive process is a 
necessary part of emotion and refused to confirm that feelings come 
first in the emotional process. His definition of emotion was a trans-
action between organism and environment in which cognitive processes 
are crucial." 
Dissonance and Cognitions 
Some authors consider cognitions the influential elements of 
emotions. Janis and Terwilliger (1962) asked subjects to read a fear 
appeal message and then give all their thoughts and feelings about what 
they had just read. They were allowed to comment at any time during 
the reading, but were asked to remark upon what they had read at the 
end of each paragraph. Janis and Terwlinger recorded the readings on 
tape and then transcribed and categorized the comments made. The 
categories are as follows: 
Affective Reactions: 
1. Expressions of worry, disturbance, emotional 
tension (i.e. , "That is awful!"). 
2. Reference to unpleasant aspects of cancer. 
Evaluative Comments: 
1. Major criticism complete rejection 
2. Minor criticism - argument not clear 
3. Major favorable I agree. 
4. Minor favorable - comments on style 
s. Paraphrasing of arguments just read 
The authors achieved .85 intercoder reliability on the independent 
ratings of comments. 
Brock (1967) developed a method for thought-listing when he s u-
died measurement of responses and not the end products of persuasion 
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such as attitude change, rejection and reduced credibility. Brock gave 
subjects 10 minutes to write everything they thought about during the 
message presentation. He developed a method for rating these ideas 
and thoughts and discovered the degree to which a person is persuaded 
is determined by that individual's thoughts. He suggested research 
continue seeking additional tools for measuring thoughts. 
Cook (1969) also used the thought-listing process to examine 
counter arguments produced by subjects during a persuasive message. 
He achieved intercoder reliability of .95 and .94 for the agreement 
measure. Other researchers have consistently used thought-listing 
as an effective tool for examining cognitions inhibiting persuasion 
attempts (Insko, Turnbull & Yandell, 1974; Osterhouse & Brock, 1970; 
Pallak, Mueller, Dollar & Pallak, 1972). 
Petty, Wells and Brock (1976) used thought-listing in a study to 
see if distraction affected yielding to propaganda. They gave subjects 
2 1/2 minutes to recall and list thoughts they had during the persua-
sive message. Judges categorizing the thoughts had .92 intercoder 
reliability. Petty et al. (1976) discovered that cognitive responses 
mediate interaction between persuasion and distraction. 
After being told the topic of the persuasive message, Petty and 
Cacioppo (1977) left subjects for five minutes. Upon their re urn 
subjects were given 2 1/2 minutes to list the thoughts they had while 
waiting and were then asked to rate their own thoughts as agreeing or 
disagreeing with the message. Judges agreed with subjects' ra ngs 
100 percent. ·Petty and Cacioppo (1979) utilized thought-listing 
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again to examine effects of issue involvement on persuasion. Once more 
they achieved significant intercoder reliability. 
The literature review has illustrated tremendous support for dis-
sonance as an emotional state, and examined studies defining emotion. 
Mehrabian and Russell (1974) analyzed the components of emotion and 
presented a reliable scale for measuring emotion using the thre 
dimensions of pleasure, arousal and dominance as factors of emotion. 
Using this literature Biggers and Christ (1983) formulated the opera-
tional definition repeated below: 
The state of dissonance can be conceptually defined as an 
emotional state composed of low pleasure, high arousal and 
at least moderate dominance. Pleasure is low because two 
associated elements are inconsistent. The more important 
these two elements are to the perceiver the greater the 
resulting arousal. If the two elements are inconsistent 
but fairly irrelevant to the perceiver, then we would expect 
displeasure but low arousal and, therefore, little pressure 
to change. As the elements become more inconsistent, more 
displeasure results. The more relevant to the perceiver, 
the greater arousal (s)he will feel. Dominance must be 
moderately high or change will not occur •••• If the per-
ceiver does not feel that they have permission to behave 
(in this case, change his/her attitude), no change will 
occur--no matter how much displeasure or arousal. 
Using the excellent foundation laid by Biggers and Christ (1983), 
this paper seeks to measure dissonance as defined above and examine 
its relationship to attitude change. Sufficient evidence is given in 
current literature to support measurement of dissonance as an emotiona 
state both with Mehrabian and Russell's (1974) bipolar adjectives and 
thought-listing. These tools were used in this paper in an attempt 
to identify dissonance as a continuous variable which might vary in 
intensity. Research indicates cognitive responses elicited by a 
communication are important in determining both the direction and 
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degree of attitude change (Petty & Cacioppo, 1979). Because the 
thought-listing procedure does not modify attitude results (Petty & 
Cacioppo, 1977), this process will also be used in this paper to as ess 
dissonance. It seems likely that more negative thoughts would resul 
from greater dissonance. 
Goethals et al. (1979) distinguished between foreseen, foresee bl , 
and unforeseeable consequences. They defined foreseen consequences 
as "those whose possible occurrence the actors are explicitly aware of 
at the time of decision." They referred to foreseeable consequences 
as results of behavior not in the actors' awareness at the time of 
decision but that they feel they (or any reasonable person) could 
have anticipated in light of the information they were explicitly 
given. Unforeseeable consequences were defined as those actors are 
not aware of and, furthermore, feel there is no way a reasonable 
person could have anticipated the consequences. They also manipulated 
knowledge of consequences (informed or not informed about the conse-
quence). 
Students were asked to give a one-minute speech on why their 
school should double the size of the freshman class. Students in the 
foreseen conditions were told their speech would be randomly selected 
to be heard by one of three groups: another group of graduate stu-
dents, the school debate team, and the school administration which was 
considering increasing the size of the freshman class. Those in the 
foreseeable condition were told their speeches would go to one of three 
groups, but they were not told what the groups were. Subjects in the 
unforeseeable conditions continued to believe their speeches were only 
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to be used by the experimenter. After students in each condition gave 
their speeches, those in the informed condition were told their speech 
was going to the school administration and those in the not informed 
conditions were told nothing. 
Goethals et al. (1979) used a 2x3 design manipulating knowledge 
(informed/not informed) and awareness of consequences (foreseen, 
foreseeable, and unforeseeable). In the informed condition there was 
no significant difference in attitude change between foreseen and 
foreseeable conditions; however, both levels of the foreseen and fore-
seeable conditions had significantly greater attitude change (p(.05) 
than that in the unforeseeable conditions. 
This experiment is a partial replication of the study by Goethals, 
Cooper and Naficy (1979). Because Goethals et al. (1979) found no 
significant difference between the foreseen and foreseeable conditions, 
this study used a 2x2 design (foreseen/unforeseeable and informed/not 
informed). Based on results of the Goethals et al. study, and the 
Biggers and Christ (1983) operational definition of dissonance, the 
following hypotheses were postulated: 
1. Subjects in the foreseen-informed and not informed 
conditions will experience lower pleasure, higher 
arousal and less dominance than subjects in the 
unforseeable-informed and not informed conditions. 
2. There will be no significant difference between 
levels of pleasure, arousal and dominance experienced 
by subjects in the foreseen-informed and not informed 
conditions. 
3. There will be no significant difference between 
levels of pleasure, arousal and dominance experienced 
by subjects in the unforeseeable-informed and not in-
formed conditions. 
METHODOLOGY 
Subjects 
One hundred and thirty students from beginning speech classes at 
the University of Central Florida volunteered to participate in thi 
experiment. There were 19 students in a pilot test designed to iden-
tify problems and increase internal validity. Twenty-six students 
served as a control group and completed the attitude scale on a tuition 
increase only. A total of 76 subjects were randomly assigned to the four 
experimental conditions. Eleven of these subjects, across the four 
conditions, refused to continue participation upon hearing the experi-
ment involved giving a one-minute speech for a tuition increase at the 
University of Central Florida. 
Results of the remaining nine participants could not be used for 
various reasons. Five students were on scholarships so the topic 
lacked relevance for them, and two advocated a tuition increase from 
the beginning. Partial results for two subjects were not tabulated 
because of improperly completed questionnaires. 
Variables 
Independent Variables 
Since Festinger first postulated the Dissonance Theory in 1957, 
many researchers have examined the conditions which produce th s psycho-
logical and physiological state. Extensive research indicates dissonance 
is produced only when the individual participating in CAA perceives 
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unwanted behavioral consequences as a result of their actions (Cooper 
& Worchel, 1970; Cooper, Zanna, & Goethals, 1974; Goethals & Cooper, 
1972). Later research indicates that subjects must foresee undesirable 
consequences if dissonance is to be generated (Cooper, 1971; Hoyt, 
Henley, & Collins, 1972). 
The independent variables in this paper were awareness of conse-
quences on two levels (foreseen and unforeseeable) and knowledge of the 
actual consequences (informed and uninformed). 
Dependent Variables 
The dependent variables were attitude change, dissonance (pleasure, 
arousal and dominance), and the cognitions (positive and negative) of 
the subjects during speech preparation and delivery. 
Attitude change was measured on a 19-point scale. Subjects were 
given a statement and asked to check the point on the scale that best 
fit attitude: 19 (total agreement) and 1 (total disagreement). A 
comparison was made between the post-treatment attitudes of the experi-
mental conditions to those subjects in the control condition. No pre-
test was administered. 
Measurement of dissonance was examined on two levels: 1) The 
emotion measurement scale developed by Mehrabian and Russell (1974) 
using pleasure, arousal and dominance (Appendix B); and 2) Cognitions 
the subjects had during their five minutes of speech preparation and 
their one-minute recorded speech (Petty, Wells & Brock, 1976). Parti-
cipants in the experiment were asked to take a few minutes to remember 
their thoughts and feelings during the six minutes in which they prepared 
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and delivered a one-minute speech. Next, they were asked to write the 
thoughts as they occurred in the eight boxes available. Upon comple-
tion of this assignment subjects were instructed as follows: 
There is one more thing I would like you to do. Put a 
plus sign (+) next to those thoughts that are positively 
related to the speech, preparation and delivery, and put 
a negative sign (-) next to those that are negatively 
related to the speech, preparation and delivery. 
Topic 
The topic chosen for this study was tuition increase. Because 
money is a subject dear to the hearts of most students, it was assumed 
the majority of individuals participating in this experiment would be 
against an escalation in fees. This assumption was supported by the 
mean attitude of the control group toward a tuition increase (mean = 
3.69 on a 19-point scale). 
Procedure 
Students were told when asked to volunteer for the experiment that 
the researcher was a graduate student completing a thesis pertaining to 
linguistic devices in oral communication. When each subject arrived at 
the experimental station he/she was given further explanation: 
As you were told in class, I am a graduate student in communi-
cations working on my thesis on the linguistics devices used 
in oral communication. This involves three areas: 1) How arg-
uments are produced; 2) Vocabulary; and 3) Extraneous words 
such as "um", "things like that", and "you know." Now I have 
chosen a topic I believe most students can relate to, tuition 
increase. I know how most students feel about this (this 
gives a chance to see how the subject feels about the issue) 
and I have plenty of speeches against a tuition increase. So, 
what I am asking you to do is to prepare and give a one minute 
speech advocating a tuition increase at UCF. You will have 
five minutes to prepare the speech. I need an equal number of 
speeches for and against a tuition increase. 
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At this point the spiel changed for subjects in each of the four 
conditions. 
Each subject received treatment individually which took approx i-
mately 20 minutes per subject. The foreseen consequences condition 
consisted of making students aware that two other groups, the school 
debate team and the school administration, were interested in l is t e ning 
to the speech recordings; therefore, their speech would be randoml y 
selected to go to one of these groups. The purpose of other groups 
receiving the speeches was explained before subjects agreed to continue 
with the experiment and give the speech. · 
There are two other groups interested in these speeches : the 
school debate team and the school administration. Your spee ch 
will be randomly selected to go to one of them. The de bate 
team is interested because it is a topic with two sides and 
they want to see how students develop arguments and what arg -
uments they produce in case they someday debate this issue. 
The school administration is interested because it is an is s ue 
they always face. They want to see what arguments students 
have both for and against a tuition increase, because there 
are arguments for both sides. 
Subjects in the unforeseeable conditions were simply asked to 
give a speech for a tuition increase and were given no indication t hat 
the speech would be used for any purpose other than that sta t e d in the 
introduction. 
The informed/not informed variable was manipulated by telling or 
not telling subjects the school administration would receive their 
speeches. Subjects in the foreseen/informed condition were informed 
after they agreed to continue with the experiment a nd be f ore they gave 
the speech. Subjects in the unforeseeable/informed c ond i t ion were 
informed after they had delivered the speech but before completing the 
questionnaire. In the unforeseeable/not informed condition, subjects 
simply gave a speech and were never told other groups were interested 
in the speeches. 
After explaining the experiment to each subject the researcher 
made the following statement: 
Now that you know what the experiment is about, you are free 
to continue or leave ("or go back to class'' if subjects were 
participating on class time). It is up to you. 
At this point subjects either continued with five minutes of speech 
preparation or left the experimental station. 
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Each subject received paper and pen to jot down notes compiled in 
the five-minute preparation. The students were free to read from their 
notes or give the speech extemporaneously. Delivery of the speech was 
recorded on a mini cassette recorder. Most students were well prepared 
to speak one minute or more while a few found it difficult to speak the 
whole minute. 
The experimenter returned after five minutes, recorded the speech 
and praised the subject for excellent presentation and persuasiveness 
of content. Subjects were then asked to complete the questionnaire. 
The questionnaire consisted of thought listing, emotion measurement 
scales, a manipulation check scale and an attitude scale. The mani-
pulation check question was phrased two ways: "I realize that my 
speech will be used for groups other than graduate students studying 
linguistic devices in oral communication" in 48 questionnaires, 
and "I was told that my speech will be used for a group other than 
graduate students studying linguistic devices in oral communication" 
in 17 questionnaires (see Appendix B). 
25 
This question was phrased two ways because three subjects in the 
unforeseeable/not informed condition checked 19 on the 19-interval 
scale indicating belief that the speech would be used by another group 
even though no mention had been made of other groups' interest. This 
caused concern that subjects interpreted the question as a request for 
permission to use the speech for other groups instead of a check on 
awareness of other groups' interest. A one-way analysis of variance 
(ANOVA) demonstrated the form of question did not significantly affect 
responses to the manipulation check. 
Upon completion of the questionnaire, the experimenter asked each 
subject to place a plus sign (+) next to thoughts which were favorable 
to the speech topic, preparation and delivery, and a negative sign (-) 
next to thoughts relating negatively. A few subjects gave thoughts a 
neutral rating. Judges were not considered necessary to code thoughts 
as either positive or negative since research on thought-listing indi-
cates high intercoder reliability between subjects' and judges' ratings 
(Janis & Terwillinger, 1962; Cook, 1969; Petty, Wells & Brock, 1976; 
Petty & Cacioppo, 1977; Petty & Cacioppo, 1979). 
When subjects finished coding thoughts, those in the informed and 
foreseen conditions were told that no group other than the researcher 
would be listening to the speeches. The experimenter then explained 
briefly the true purpose of the experiment. 
One week after completion of data gathering each class received 
a letter explaining the purpose of the experiment in greater depth. 
This letter is in Appendix C. 
RESULTS 
The manipulation check indicated that subjects did understand 
their speeches would be forwarded to the designated groups. Table 1 
contains the mean responses to the statement "I realize (I was told) 
that my speech will be used for a group other than graduate students 
studying linguistic devices used in oral communication." 
TABLE 1 
MEAN AVERAGE OF 
KNOWLEDGE OF POSSIBLE SPEECH AUDIENCES 
Condition 
Informed 
Not 
Informed 
Foreseen Unforeseeable 
Means not sharing a common subscript differ at 
the .01% level using Neuman-Keuls. 
The means were derived from a 19-interval scale, with l indica ing 
belief that the speech would not be used by another group and 19 indi-
eating an understanding that the speech would be used by a designated 
group. Inclusion of the three subjects from the unforeseeable/not 
informed condition who checked 19 in the statistical analysis does not 
change the result. The analysis indicates that the appropriate groups 
did understand their speeches would be used. 
26 
Emotion Scale 
The 9-point emotion scale developed by Mehrabian and Russell 
(1974) was assigned the same scale used by those authors: a scale of 
+4 to -4 for each dimension ranging from +4 for extreme happiness to 
-4 for extreme unhappiness. The responses were averaged across the 
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six items of each emotional factor. Mehrabian and Russell administered 
the scales to subjects in random order; however, this study gave the 
scales grouped in the respective emotion category. 
The first hypothesis was not supported. This hypothesis stated 
that subjects in the foreseen conditions would experience lower plea-
sure, higher arousal and less dominance than subjects in the unfore-
seeable conditions. Subjects in the unforeseeable/not informed 
condition experienced greater pleasure than those in the other three 
conditions; however, the difference was not significant. Arousal 
measures indicated little difference between conditions, except 
unforeseeable/not informed subject had a lower mean arousal than the 
other three conditions. Both the unforeseeable/not informed and fore-
seen/ informed subjects experienced feelings of greater dominance than 
those in the other groups, but not significantly so. 
Hypotheses two and three were supported. No significant differ-
ence resulted between levels of pleasure, arousal and dominance for 
the foreseen/informed and not informed conditions. There was also 
no significant difference between levels of pleasure, arousal and 
dominance for the unforeseeable/informed and not informed conditions. 
Table 2 on the· following page illustrates the mean emotion measures 
for each condition. The F=.659 for pleasure, F=.249 for arousal and 
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F=.317 for dominance across all four conditions presents strong sup-
port for hypotheses two and three. 
TABLE 2 
MEAN AVERAGE 
EMOTIONAL DIMENSION FOR EACH CONDITION 
Emotion Pleasure Arousal Dominance 
Foreseen/Informed 1.076 .999 1.208 
Foreseen/Not Informed 1.044 1.054 .861 
Total Mean for Foreseen 1.060 1. 027 1. 034 
Unforeseeable/Informed • 989 1.156 .918 
Unforeseeable/Not Informed 1. 510 .770 1. 219 
Total Mean for Unforeseeable 1.250 .963 1.068 
F Ratios Across All Four 
Conditions .659 • 249 • 317 
It should be noted that if both the foreseen and unforeseeable 
conditions are combined, the results for all three emotional dimensions 
are in the predicted direction. Pleasure was less, arousal greater, 
and dominance less in the foreseen than in the unforeseeable conditions. 
Thought-listing 
Subjects in each condition related more positive than negative 
thoughts about the topic, speech preparation and delivery. The ratio 
of positive to negative thoughts is shown in Table 3. A two (positive 
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and negative thoughts) by four (conditions) analysis of variance indi-
cated there were significantly more positive than negative thoughts 
TABLE 3 
TOTAL THOUGHTS AND 
RATIO OF POSITIVE TO NEGATIVE THOUGHTS 
Thoughts Positive Negative Total 
Foreseen/Informed 4.00 2.44 6.44 
Foreseen/Not Informed 4.47 1.59 6.06 
Unforeseeable/Informed 4.19 1. 56 5.75 
Unforeseeable/Not Informed 3.69 2.19 5.88 
overall (p(.01). The ratio of positive to negative thoughts did not 
differ across conditions. Table 4 gives the ratio of positive to 
TABLE 4 
MEAN POSITIVE AND NEGATIVE THOUGHTS 
ABOUT THE ISSUE 
Thoughts Positive Negative 
Foreseen/Informed 2.44 .81 
Foreseen/Not Informed 3.59 .88 
Unforeseeable/Informed 3.44 1.00 
Unforeseeable/Not Informed 1. 25 .50 
Total 
3.25 
4.47 
4.44 
1.75 
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negative thoughts in each condition about the issue. It seems reason-
able to suggest that the greater the dissonance the higher the ratio 
of positive to negative thoughts. This could be predicted on the 
basis that attitude change is a function of the ratio of positive to 
negative thoughts generated toward the topic. However, this was not 
the case in the current experiment. In fact, the ratio of positive to 
negative thoughts did not differ across the four conditions. 
Attitude Change 
Significant attitude change comparable to that of Goethals et al. 
(1979) was achieved. One difference exists between Goethals et al. and 
this study. This study included a control condition in which students 
were asked only to state their opinions on a tuition increase at the 
University of Central Florida. Table 5 summarizes the results. 
TABLE 5 
MEAN ATTITUDE FOR EACH CONDITION INCLUDING CONTROL 
Foreseen/ 
Informed 
Foreseen/ 
Not Informed 
Unforeseeable/ 
Informed 
Control 3.69a 
Unforeseeable/ 
Not Informed 
Means not sharing a common subscript differ at the 5% level. 
6.69 differs from the foreseen conditions at the 10% level. 
Higher numbers indicate greater agreement with a tuition 
increase (19-interval scale). 
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As shown in Table 5, the foreseen conditions produced signif i-
cantly more favorable attitudes toward a tuition increase than the 
unforeseeable/informed and control conditions. The results are similar 
to those of Goethals et al. (1979). In both studies, subjects who 
were more aware of negative consequences changed their attitudes to 
agree with a tuition increase more than those subjects who were not 
aware of negative consequences. The resulting attitude changes are 
in line with the dissonance theory. However, since the emotion and 
thought-listing measures yielded no significant evidence of dissonance, 
the data are more amenable to a self-perception theory explanation. 
DISCUSSION 
The manipulation check results indicate that subjects in the 
appropriate conditions were aware that their speeches would be for-
warded to one of two other groups. There was a significant informed 
main effect. 
Attitude change was in the expected direction. There was no 
significant difference within the two foreseen conditions or within the 
two unforeseeable conditions. Significance resulted at p(.01 for 
attitude change between the foreseen groups and the control group. 
Results from the foreseen conditions differed from the unforeseeable/ 
informed condition at the p(.05 and the unforeseeable/not informed 
condition at p(.10. These results are comparable with those of the 
Goethals et al. (1979) study. 
No significance resulted for any of the three emotion dimensions 
across the four conditions. Findings were in the predicted direction; 
however, because significance levels are so small (F(l.O) for all three 
dimensions, this must be attributed to chance. Subjects in the fore-
seen conditions reported slightly less pleasure, more arousal and less 
dominance than those in the unforeseeable conditions. 
Results from the thought-listing instrument did not support the 
theory that dissonance is an uncomfortable emotion. A two (positive 
and negative thoughts) by four (conditions) ANOVA showed that subject s 
listed significantly more positive than negative thoughts overall 
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(p<.Ol). Total number of thoughts generated did not differ a c ros s 
conditions. 
The results of this paper are in the same direction as Geothals 
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et al. (1979). Goethals et al. reported significant dif f erences of 
p<.OS between the foreseen and foreseeable conditions and the unf ore -
seeable conditions. The current study produced a comparable difference 
between the foreseen and unforeseeable/informed condition and a p ( . 10 
difference between the foreseen and unforeseeable/not informed con di -
tion. The unforeseeable/not informed condition is the only one tha t 
did not differ significantly from the control group. 
Goethals et al. explained their results with dissonance t heor y , 
but, like others, failed to provide a measure of dissonance. They 
discussed their findings in relation to personal responsibility 
and dissonance arousal. Though Goethals et al. believed the s elf -
justificatory attitude change was present in the foreseen and fo r esee-
able conditions due to dissonance, they concluded that dissonance 
was not present in the unforeseeable conditions. 
The findings of this paper do support Goethals et al. conclusion 
that no dissonance arousal existed in the unforeseeab l e gr ou ps ; how-
ever, there is also no indication of dissonance in the f oreseen groups . 
Therefore these data do not support the dissonance theo r y . Both the 
emotion scale and thought-listing results fail to indica t e the presence 
of dissonance in subjects during the treatment. 
Self-perception theory provides a better fit f or the data . Bern 
(1970, p.15) gives the major hypothesis of sel f -perception as follows: 
In identifying his own internal states, an individual 
partially relies on the same external cues that others 
use when they infer his internal states. 
This theory is in line with dissonance theory in that the theme is 
behavior causes change. The difference lies in the intervening 
variable. Dissonance claims that an unpleasant emotion caused by 
inconsistency results in attitude change due to an attempt to justify 
actions. Self-perception states that an individual actually infers 
attitudes from his/her behavior and accompanying environmental cues; 
there is no inconsistency or unpleasantness. 
The many definitions of dissonance attribute emotional charac-
teristics such as guilt, tension, post-decision anxiety and arousal 
to this phenomena. After extensive research, Biggers and Christ 
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(1983) operationally defined dissonance as an emotion low in pleasure, 
high in arousal and slightly higher than midpoint on the dominance-
submissiveness dimension. 
Using the emotion scale developed by Mehrabian and Russell (1974), 
this paper endeavored to measure dissonance across four conditions. 
No significant difference ensued between emotional dimensions of 
pleasure, arousal and dominance across the four conditions. Howe ver, 
findings were in the predicted direction. Subjects in the unf oresee-
able conditions reported more pleasure, less arousal and more dominance 
overall. Arousal is above the midpoint as expected, but the above 
midpoint ratings for pleasure and dominance were unexpected f or t he 
foreseen groups. 
Dominance is an emotional dimension only recently consid e r ed a 
component of dissonance by Biggers and Christ (1983). Because little 
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research is available on dominance and dissonance, it is difficult 
to present dominance findings. It is conceivable that subjects saw 
themselves as persuaders rather than experimental guinea pigs. Taking 
an unpopular stand (pro-tuition increase) would call for a more per-
suasive message in order to convince an audience that one is justified 
in taking a given position. The subjects' responsibility for a persua-
sive speech put them in control of their audience to a certain extent. 
Knowing they chose to give the speech could also have increased dominant 
feelings. 
The lack of significant differences in ratings of pleasure across 
conditions is puzzling. Some may argue students did not perceive 
negative consequences and that participation was perceived as forced. 
However, reactions of the subjects do not support such an explanation. 
Subjects reacted negatively to the possibility of others hearing their 
speeches. This is demonstrated by the many negative comments students 
made before they agreed to continue participation. For example, three 
students said they were not good at giving speeches and did not want 
anyone to hear them, and eight students refused to participate because 
they could not think of any reasons to raise the tuition. Many stu-
dents still agreed to participate even when told others besides the 
experimenter were interested in listening to the speeches. 
The significance of the manipulation check also supports the per-
ception of negative consequences. Not only does dissent of 11 students 
to continue participation indicate successful manipulation of choice, 
but also intimates refusal due to perception of negative consequences. 
The relatively high scores reported on the pleasure dimension were 
also supported by the cognitions. All subjects listed more positive 
cognitions than negative cognitions regarding the task. 
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Overall, the findings conform most closely with self-perception 
theory (Bem, 1965). Where dissonance theory claims it is post-decision 
anxiety that causes attitude change, Bem argues subjects infer their 
attitudes from overt behavior. Our results indicate anxiety did not 
vary across CAA conditions. 
Bern (1972) claims that individuals infer their attitudes from 
behavior only when "internal cues are weak, ambiguous, or uninterpre-
table." This statement appears contrary to CAA where the advocate 
holds strong internal beliefs (Smith, 1982, p. 135). Yet, the results 
achieved in this paper intimate support for the self-perception theory 
even though it is evident that students' did not have weak internal 
beliefs regarding a tuition increase initially. The fact that some 
subjects refused to continue participation because they could think of 
no arguments advocating a tuition increase and the low mean attitude 
score of the control group demonstrate the strong feelings held by 
most University of Central Florida students against a tuition increase. 
Smith (1982, pp. 135-136) writes that self-perception theory is 
too simplistic and that Bern disregards the content of self-generated 
messages. Smith's thesis disagrees with Himmelfarb and Eagley (1974, 
pp. 37, 607) who claim Bem seems to be leaning toward an interest in 
information processing and a concern with "how information about 
self-discrepant behavior is processed in effecting attitude change." 
These authors go one step further by asking: Why do people process 
information and react in certain ways? Some suggested motivations are 
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the desire for internal consistency and self-esteem preservation. 
Himmelfarb and Eagley (1974, p. 607) note the suggestion by Kelman and 
Baron that internal inconsistency triggers an alert that something is 
wrong and motivates the person to seek out the problem and solution. 
This paper did examine information processing, but it did not 
go so far as to study the motivations behind cognitions produced. 
Cognitions reported by subjects tend to support the self-perception 
theory. The ratio of positive to negative thoughts is 2:1. Positive 
thoughts were principally those arguments developed by subjects advo-
cating a tuition increase. Few cognitions indicated conflict relating 
to the topic. Most negative thoughts concerned a dislike for giving 
speeches. 
Where dissonance explains the inverse relationship between reward 
and attitude change with self-justification, self-perception theory 
explains it with truth or lie signals. Bern (1970) supports this 
thesis with an illustration from advertising. He notes that we tend 
to believe the person who tells us something without any or little 
reward. For instance, the claims of a housewife interviewed in the 
grocery regarding a household cleaning product are more credible than 
those made by a movie star. The audience sees the housewife as being 
truthful since she is not receiving a large reward for her statement 
yet makes it anyway. This is not the case with the movie star who 
receives a large salary, and probably does very little housework and 
grocery shopping. 
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Bem believes that individuals infer their attitudes from their 
behavior in the same way they inf er the attitudes of others by their 
actions and demeanor. He conducted an experiment to examine his 
hypothesis. Subjects were administered electric shocks, equal in vol-
tage, and told they could terminate the shock anytime they wanted. 
Subjects reported the shocks they terminated early as being more 
painful. Bern used this to illustrate his point that individuals 
interpret their actions from their behavior. 
One postulate regarding the findings of this paper is that 
subjects may have surmised their attitudes from their thoughts. 
Perhaps students noticed the number of arguments they were able to 
produce supporting a tuition increase and re-evaluated their attitudes 
accordingly. They may have concluded that if they could produce 
arguments for a tuition increase then they could not have been so 
adamantly against an increase in the first place. However, one issue 
arises with this supposition. Why did some subjects change attitudes 
more than others even though the ratio of positive to negative thoughts 
was the same across conditions? This may be explained with Bern's truth 
and lie signals. The thought processes of subjects may have been as 
follows: 
Foreseen Conditions-
1. I agreed to prepare and deliver a pro-tuition speech. 
2. I fulfilled this agreement. 
3. I did so knowing the speech might be given to university 
decision makers. 
4. I must, then, believe that a tuition increase is a 
reasonable idea (mean= 10.35 is just above midpoint on 
the 19-interval scale). 
Unforeseeable/Informed Condition-
1. I agreed to do the speech. 
2. I did it. 
3. I was later told it would go to a university group. 
4. It bothers me that my speech will be given to this 
group. 
5. I don't feel very good about a tuition increase 
(mean= 5.94). 
Unforeseeable/Not Informed Condition-
1. I agreed to do a speech. 
2. I did it. 
3. It is only being used for an experiment on linguistics. 
4. I don't really believe in a tuition increase 
(mean = 6.69). 
Though the observations of this paper point toward the self per-
ception theory as a viable explanation, this theory faces bias from 
students of attitude change. The prevailing opinion is that attitude 
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is an intervening variable intruding between environmental stimulation 
and overt responses (Miller, 1973). Though Bem has research support 
for his theory, the obstacle to wide acceptance is the common view 
that behavior follows attitude and not vice versa. 
Possible Threats to Validity 
Threats to internal validity are always present in research. If 
it were not for confounding variables, every researcher's problems 
would be solved. However, this is not the case, and there are several 
possible threats to validity in the current study. 
First, data collection occurred over a four-day period to give 
a wide selection of sign-up times for volunteers. Volunteers were 
recruited from eight beginning speech classes. Each subject was run in-
dividually by the experimenter and the whole process took approximately 
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1/2 hour per treatment. To prevent leaks from subjects to fellow 
classmates over the week, each class was assigned a specific day on 
which students from that class could participate. This procedure 
minimized, but did not rule out the possibility of inter-subject 
communication. However, random questionning of subjects indicated 
this procedure to be successful overall. Only one subject, whose 
results were not used, admitted he was told by a classmate leaving the 
lab exactly what would transpire in the experiment. A few students 
said they asked for details, but subjects who had finished the treat-
ment were very close-mouthed. It seemed students enjoyed feeling in 
"cahoots" with the experimenter by withholding information. 
Evaluation apprehension may be cited as a threat to the internal 
validity of this study, but freedom of choice to participate should 
have alleviated that problem. In actuality, those students most 
afraid of speech delivery did decline to continue participation. 
One last area for comment is the selection of subjects. Because 
students volunteered for certain time slots each day, it was impossible 
to randomly select subjects from the Speech 1014 pool. However, 
questionnaires were randomly organized, and the available subjects were 
randomly assigned to groups. Random assignment removes selection bias 
as a threat to internal validity. 
Recommended Changes in Methodology 
Two methodological changes are recommended to those who wish to 
replicate. First, future researchers should consider alleviating 
anonymity for the speakers. Goethals et al. ( 1979) recorded the 
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name and purpose of the presentation in front of the subject before 
the subject actually delivered the speech. This change would increase 
perception of negative consequences, feelings of personal responsi-
bility, and perhaps reduce ratings of pleasure for the task. It would 
also reiterate the condition each subject was in and provide documenta-
tion for future examination. 
Additionally, replicators of this study should consider admini-
stering the questionnaire in two parts. A two page questionnaire 
asking four different things may have overwhelmed subjects. It was 
initially hoped that listing cognitions occuring throughout speech 
preparation and delivery would help individuals remember the emotions 
experienced during that time also. This may have been the case, but 
since the scales for attitude and perception of negative consequences 
were so different from the first two sections, it is recommended that 
the last two scales be administered separately. 
Areas For Future Research 
It is critical that dissonance be measured if it is to remain a 
viable explanation of attitude change due to CAA. If the Mehrabian 
and Russell (1974) scale, upon further examination, is considered 
inadequate for tapping dissonance, efforts should be made to seek 
other measurement tools. Future researchers of dissonance and self-
perception theories should actively examine the thoughts of subjects 
as a means of studying emotions leading to attitude change. Thought-
listing has become an accepted method for studying information 
processing. The possibilities for use are numerous. Thoughts can be 
analyzed for quantity and content in a variety of different ways. 
Though the attitude change results of this study are commensor-
a te with perception of negative consequences, subjects' cognitions 
expressed little concern that the school administration would hear 
the speeches. There could be two reasons for this: 1) students' 
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names were not recorded before each speech; therefore, they retained 
anonymity; and 2) students were only told the school administration 
was always faced with the possibility of a tuition increase, but not 
that it was an immediate consideration. In future replication of this 
study consideration should be given to increasing the possible negative 
consequences resulting from CAA. 
SUMMARY 
The purpose of this study was to measure dissonance as an emotion 
in light of the many definitions posited on the phenomena. A 2x2 de-
sign was used manipulating knowledge of possible negative consequences 
on two levels (foreseen and unforeseeable) and concrete evidence of 
negative consequences (informed and not informed). Sixty-five students 
from beginning speech classes at the University of Central Florida 
participated in the experiment. Attitude change results were consis-
tent with those predicted by the dissonance theory and self-perception 
theories. Subjects in the foreseen conditions had significantly 
greater attitude change toward the CAA than those in the unforeseeable 
conditions. 
A scale for measuring emotions, developed by Mehrabian and Russell 
(1974), was used to measure dissonance on three dimensions: pleasure, 
arousal and dominance. It was predicted that subjects in the foreseen 
conditions would have significantly lower pleasure, greater arousal 
and less dominance than those in the unforeseeable conditions. The 
hypothesis was not supported. Since levels of dissonance were not 
obtained, results were explained with the self-perception model. 
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APPENDICES 
APPENDIX A 
SIGN-UP SHEET AND CONTROL GROUP ATTITUDE SCALE 
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Please sign your name for the time convenient for you. It should 
take 20 minutes at the maximum. Meet in the Journalism Lab, Humani-
ties and Fine Arts Building, fourth floor, room 403. Thank you. 
9:00 1:40 6:20 
A.M. 
9:20 2:00 6:40 
9:40 2:20 7:00 
10:00 2:40 7:20 
10:20 3:00 7:40 
10:40 3:20 8:00 
11: 00 3:40 8:20 
11:20 4:00 8:40 
11: 40 4:20 9:00 
12: 00 4:40 9:20 
P.M. 
12:20 5:00 9:40 
12:40 5:20 
Date: 
1:00 5:40 
1:20 6:00 
There were two places for signatures under each time slot. 
I agree that tuition at the University of Central Florida 
should be raised. 
No _________________ ns 
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APPENDIX B 
QUESTIONNAIRES 
QUESTIONNAIRE 
We are interested in what you were thinking about during your 
speech preparation and delivery. Simply write down the first 
idea that comes to mind in the first box, the second idea in 
the second box, etc. Please put only one idea or thought in 
a box and be specific. You should try to only record those 
ideas you were thinking during speech preparation and delivery. 
You will have a few minutes to write your thoughts. Please be 
completely honest and list all of the thoughts that you had. 
Please remember to only list specific thoughts you had during 
speech preparation and delivery. 
11. 
I 
I 2. 
I 
I 3. 
I 
14. 
I 
1 s. 
I 
I 6. 
I 
17. 
I 
I 8. 
I 
PLEASE GO TO NEXT PAGE 
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The following scales provide a range of moods you may have 
experienced while making notes for your speech and during 
the delivery of your speech. Take about two minutes to 
really get into the mood of the situation. Please report 
the feelings you had only during your speech preparation and 
delivery by responding to the adjective pairs below. Some of 
the pairs might seem unusual, but you probably felt more one 
way than the other. So, for each pair, put a check mark 
(Example: __ :~: __ ) closer to the adjective which you be-
lieve describes your feelings better. The more appropriate 
that adjective seems, the closer you put your check mark to 
it. Please remember only to report the feelings you experi-
ence during your speech preparation and delivery. 
Happy 
Pleased 
Satisfied 
Contented 
Hopeful 
Relaxed 
Stimulated 
Excited 
Frenzied 
Jittery 
Wide Awake 
Aroused 
Controlling 
Influential 
In Control 
Important 
Dominant 
Autonomous 
. . . . . . . . 
. . . . . . . . 
-- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- ---
. . . . . . . . 
. . . . . . . . 
-- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- --
. . . . . . . . 
. . . . . . . . 
-- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- --
. . . . . . . . 
. . . . . . . . 
-- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- --
. . . . . . . . 
. . . . . . . . 
-- -- -- -- -- -- ·-- -- --
. . . . . . . . 
. . . . . . . . 
-- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- --
. . . . . . . . 
. . . . . . . . 
-- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- --
. . . . . . . . 
. . . . . . . . 
-- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- --
. . . . . . . . 
. . . . . . . . 
-- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- --. . . . . . . . 
. . . . . . . . 
-- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- --
. . . . . . . . 
. . . . . . . . 
-- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- --
. . . . . . 
. . . . . . . . 
-- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- --
. . . . . . . . 
. . . . . . . . 
-- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- --
. . . . . . . . 
. . . . . . . . 
-- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- --
. . . . . . . . 
. . . . . . . . 
-- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- --. . . . . . . . 
. . . . . . . . 
-- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- --. . . . . . . . 
. . . . . . . . 
-- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- --. . . . . . . . 
. . . . . . . . 
-- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- --
Unhappy 
Annoyed 
Unsatisfied 
Melancholic 
Despairing 
Bored 
Relaxed 
Calm 
Sluggish 
Dull 
Sleepy 
Unaroused 
Controlled 
Influenced 
Cared For 
Awed 
Submissive 
Guided 
Please check the point on the following scales that best 
fits your answer. 
1. I realize that my speech will be used for a group other 
than graduate students studying linguistic devices used in 
oral communication. 
------------· ------ ~s NO 
2. I agree that tuition at the University of Central Florida 
should be raised. 
NO--· --------------- ~S 
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QUESTIONNAIRE 
We are interested in what you were thinking about during your 
speech preparation and delivery. Simply write down the first 
idea that comes to mind in the first box, the second idea in 
the second box, etc. Please put only one idea or thought in 
a box and be specific. You should try to only record those 
ideas you were thinking during speech preparation and delivery. 
You will have a few minutes to write your thoughts. Please be 
completely honest and list all of the thoughts that you had. 
Please remember to only list specific thoughts you had during 
speech preparation and delivery. 
I 1. 
I 
I 2. 
I 
I 3. 
I 
14. 
I 
Is. 
I 
I 6. 
I 
17. 
I 
18. 
I 
PLEASE GO TO NEXT PAGE 
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The following scales provide a range of moods you may have 
experienced while making notes for your speech and during 
the delivery of your speech. Take about two minutes to 
really get into the mood of the situation. Please report 
the feelings you had only during your speech preparation and 
delivery by responding to the adjective pairs below. Some of 
the pairs might seem unusual, but you probably felt more one 
way than the other. So, for each pair, put a check mark 
(Example: __ :__!._: __ ) closer to the adjective which you be-
lieve describes your feelings better. The more appropriate 
that adjective seems, the closer you put your check mark to 
it. Please remember only to report the feelings you experi-
ence during your speech preparation and delivery. 
Happy 
Pleased 
Satisfied 
Contented 
Hopeful 
Relaxed 
Stimulated 
Excited 
Frenzied 
Jittery 
Wide Awake 
Aroused 
Controlling 
Influential 
In Control 
Important 
Dominant 
Autonomous 
. . . . . . . . 
. . . . . . . . 
-- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- --
. . . . . . . . 
. . . . . . . . 
-- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- --
. . . . . . . . 
. . . . . . . . 
-- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- --. . . . . . . . 
. . . . . . . . 
-- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- --
. . . . . . . . 
. . . . . . . . 
-- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- --
. . . . . . . . 
. . . . . . . . 
-- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- --
. . . . . . . . 
. . . . . . . . 
-- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- --
. . . . . . . . 
. . . . . . . . 
-- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- --
. . . . . . . . 
. . . . . . . . 
-- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- --
. . . . . . . . 
. . . . . . . . 
-- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- --. . . . . . . 
. . . . . . . 
-- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- --
: : : : : : : : 
-- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- --
. . . . . . . . 
. . . . . . . . 
-- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- --
. . . . . . . . 
. . . . . . . . 
-- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- --
. . . . . . . . 
. . . . . . . . 
-- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- --. . . . . . . . 
. . . . . . . . 
-- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- --
. . . . . . . . 
. . . . . . . . 
-- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- --
. . . . . . . . 
. . . . . . . . 
-- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- --
Unhappy 
Annoyed 
Unsatisfied 
Melancho lie 
Despairing 
Bored 
Relaxed 
Calm 
Sluggish 
Dull 
Sleepy 
Unaroused 
Controlled 
Influenced 
Cared For 
Awed 
Submissive 
Guided 
Please check the point on the following scales that best 
fits your answer. 
1. I was told that my speech will be used for a group other 
than graduate students studying linguistic devices used in 
oral communication. 
NO - - - - - - - - - - - - - YES 
2. I agree that tuition at the University of Central Florida 
should be raised. 
------------------IBS NO 
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APPENDIX C 
DEBRIEFING LETTER 
The Thesis Title is "A Method for Evaluating Dissonance a an Emotion 
leading to Attitude Change." 
A short definition of dissonance is: 
The feeling a person experiences when he/she participates in 
behavior contrary to their beliefs. 
54 
There have been over 900 studies done on this phenomena. Most research 
shows that persons who participate in activity counter to their atti-
tudes (counterattitudinal advocacy-CAA), they usually change their 
attitude to match their behavior. 
Some researchers credit this attitude change to dissonance. They 
believe that the conflict people feel when they act contradictory to 
their beliefs, the uncomfortable conflict causes them to change. 
Research indicates that attitude change may result from this feeling, 
but no one has explicitly sought to investigate dissonance as an emo-
tion itself. There are two reasons for this: 1) Emotions are very 
hard to define; and 2) Emotions are difficult to measure. This presents 
a difficulty in dissonance research, however. Because dissonance has 
never been "proven" so to speak, dissonance researchers are always 
facing scholars who do not credit their explanations for attitude 
change. 
The purpose of my paper is to define dissonance operationally and then 
measure it. Mehrabian and Russell, in 1974, developed a 81% reliable 
tool for measuring emotions. This was the scale on the second page of 
the questionnaire. 
I hoped that by asking students to give speeches advocating a tuition 
increase (the majority of students are against this) they would experi-
ence dissonance and attitude change. At this point, I do not have my 
results computed, but when they are, they will be available in the 
library in my thesis. 
Thank you so much for your cooperation. It was greatly appreciated. 
If any of you seek a masters and are required to do a thesis, just 
give me a holler. 
Don't feel bad ••• I have begun to think that a tuition increase isn't a 
bad idea after all. 
Signature 
P.S. Your speeches are not going to be listened to by anyone. That 
was just a manipulation to increase dissonance. 
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